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Abstract: Since the 1990s, social scientists and philosophers argue that a multicultural, 
democratic society is characterized by two complementary virtues, namely, toleration and 
mutual recognition. While toleration provides the individual with necessary freedom rights, 
mutual recognition means that citizens are approved, respected and esteemed by others, 
feeling that they belong to the same community. The virtue of recognition (Anerkennung, 
reconnaissance) is normally considered to be a 19th-century invention of Hegel. 
However, both the terminology and the phenomenon of mutual recognition have long 
Christian roots. The Latin verbs agnoscere and recognoscere are abundantly used in theology 
to depict a new appreciation of personal others. Thomas Aquinas and Calvin employ the 
concept to describe a normative acknowledgement. Schleiermacher outlines justification by 
faith as a divine act of recognition. Vatican II and the ecumenical movement understand 
recognition as a spiritual event taking place between members of different faith communities. 
The paper argues, in keeping with my book Recognition and Religion (Oxford 2016), that the 
modern concept of mutual recognition has a long prehistory in Christian theology. 
 
1. Current Politics of Recognition 
 
In his seminal essay of 1992, originally titled “Multiculturalism and Politics of Recognition”, 
the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor launches the concept of mutual recognition into 
contemporary democratic decision-making. While Taylor considers the idea of toleration to 
be extremely important, he also claims that toleration is not alone sufficient to guarantee the 
well-being of minorities in democratic societies. In addition, we need special acts of  
recognizing minorities, and the minorities are supposed to the society that recognize them. 
Through such mutual recognition, the minorities can cherish their cultural difference and at 
the same time become equal societal partners.1 
     Such acts of recognizing others can, at least so says the theory, prevent the segregation of 
sub-cultures in multicultural societies. Acts of mutual recognition are expected to prevent the 
emergence of alternative societies taking place within the macrostructure of democracy. In 
mutual recognition, majorities identify minorities and affirm their particular identity and right 
to pursue goal relevant to their own flourishing. As a return gift, the minorities affirm the 
overall rule of law in democratic state and commit themselves in cooperation with the society 
at large.2  
     After Taylor’s essay, such politics of recognition, or positive identity politics, has been 
extensively discussed and debated in social sciences. According to another leading theorist, 
the German philosopher Axel Honneth, people seek recognition in three distinct and related 
spheres of life. In the private sphere, people seek loving recognition. As citizens of 
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democratic state, people seek respect and legal recognition in terms of equality. In their 
professional life, people seek esteem that values their individual skills, virtues and life goals.3  
    According to Honneth, such broad concept of threefold recognition stems from young 
Hegel’s philosophy of Anerkennung. From Fichte and Hegel, the concept of recognition has 
found its way to diplomatic and political theory already in the 19th century. However, it is 
only the late modern identity politics in which the usefulness of mutual recognition as 
psychological, social and political concept can be fruitfully understood.4  
     Both Taylor and Honneth consider mutual recognition to be a secular virtue of the 
Enlightenment and the Hegelian modernity. Recognition is in this manner a twin sister of 
toleration. While toleration provides us with freedom rights, recognition can produce 
minority rights and social cohesion. Thus the twin sisters contribute to the well-being of late 
modern secular democratic society.5  
     At the same time, Taylor and Honneth also consider that the strive for mutual recognition 
is a basic psychological and anthropological fact which is due to child development and 
occupies human beings without respect to particular cultural surroundings. Everyone needs 
love, respect and esteem everywhere, not just in modern European society or in late modern 
identity politics. In my view, there is some tension between the alleged emergence of 
recognition in secular modernity on the one hand and the claim of a universal need for 
recognition on the other. If people have always strived after recognition, how can it be it that 
this has been realized only since Hegel? 
     Some philosophers have also asked about the longer history of recognition discourses. 
Paul Ricoeur considers that the concept has some roots in the idea of anagnorisis, 
identification or knowing again, wiedererkennen, a significant theme in Aristotle’s poetics. 
However, Ricoeur also considers that the idea of Anerkennung, meaning both identification 
and normative evaluation, only stems from Hegel. Ricoeur and his colleague Marcel Henaff 
add to this that such recognition need not only emerge from violent struggle. It can also be a 
gesture of hospitality and peaceful gift exchange.6  
        Recently, Piero Boitani has published an extensive intellectual history of Aristotelian 
anagnorisis. Boitani pays attention to the Latin terms agnosco, agnitio, which carry the 
Aristotelian idea in Western literature. It needs to be added, however, that the poetic idea of 
re-identification is different from the normative recognition outlined by Honneth and Taylor.7 
    This new discussion in social theory has also been received in theology. In contemporary 
German Catholicism, Veronika Hoffmann has investigated its theological potential, in 
particular when recognition is considered as peaceful gift exchange, eine Gabe der 
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Anerkennung. In American theology, Timothy Lim has recently published  an ecclesiological 
elaboration of the Hegelian variant.8  
 
2. Recognition and Religion: Ancent Roots 
 
     At the University of Helsinki, we conduct a research project titled “Reason and Religious 
Recognition”. Our team includes theologians, historians and philosophers. We take the theory 
of Honneth and Taylor seriously and collaborate with the German philosophers and 
theologians working at the universities of Frankfurt and Münster. At the same time, we claim 
that the history of normative recognition does not start with Hegel but has a long prehistory in 
Christian theology. Because of this prehistory, recognition is a much less secular concept 
than toleration, and it can be fruitfully applied to ecumenism and other issues of Christian 
identity. Because this application is genuinely Christian, it does not simply follow Hegel or 
other modern theories but develops its own theological criteria. In my paper of today, I will 
elucidate this claim of long Christian history of recognition with some examples. 
     Let me begin with mentioning three recent publications. A thematic issue of the journal 
Open Theology (2/2016) gathers the papers given at the American Academy of Religion’s 
session on recognition in 2015. The proceedings of Societas Oecumenica, the European 
university ecumenists’ recent conference in Helsinki 2016, is titled Recognition and 
Reception in Ecumenical Relations.9 We were very happy to host professor Marcel Hénaff in 
our conference and are proud that he contributed to this volume. 
     My following historical orientations are based on a third publication, namely, my own 
recent monograph Recognition and Religion. In this book I present my arguments for the 
claim that recognition is an ancient Christian concept which has influenced the modern 
philosophy but which also has its own, distinct intellectual profile.10 Like Piero Boitani, I 
often focus on the Latin terms agnosco, agnitio, which are since medieval times employed as 
synonymous with recognosco, recognitio, and which are not only translating Aristotelian re-
identification but are also distinct legal and religious terms.  
      One point of departure in my own history is the Latin Bible. In the Vulgate, the Greek 
ginosko is normally translated with cognosco. The almost synonymous verb epiginosko is, 
however, often translated with agnosco. Agnosco and agnitio are in the Roman law employed 
to highlight some performative legal transactions, like adoption (agnitio filii) and approval of 
testament (hereditatem agnoscere). Due to such performative uses, some passages in the 
Vulgate give the impression of normative approval due to identification, a meaning that is 
very close to the idea of recognition.11 
     Influential passages of this kind include 1. Tim 2:4, reading “God desires everyone to be 
saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth (epignosis tes aletheias, agnitio veritatis). In  
Tit 1:1 Paul calls himself a servant of God for the sake of the knowledge of the truth (again 
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epignosis tes aletheias, agnitio veritatis). In such passages, the term agnitio does not only 
mean observation but also approval and affirmation, a performative and normative move 
which semantically resembles the act of adoption in Roman law.12 
      The phrase agnitio veritatis is used prominently in an early Christian novel, the so-called 
pseudo-Clementine Recognitions, of which the Latin translation is extant and has been used 
through the medieval and early modern period. From the surviving Greek fragments we know 
that the word recognitio translates the Greek term anagnorismos. Recognitio and agnitio are 
also used synonymously. The somewhat clumsy plot of this novel reveals a familiarity with 
the Aristotelian poetic view of re-identification. The novel tells the story of Clement, who 
meets apostles and his own family members, discovering their identities in the context of his 
own life story. This horizontal recognition is close to Aristotle’s anagnorisis.13 
    In addition to this, and most importantly, the novel explains how Clement becomes true 
Christian in a vertical encounter with the True Prophet, or God in Jesus Christ. This vertical 
encounter is repeatedly described with the Pauline phrase agnitio veritatis. Such agnitio is not 
very philosophical but simple knowledge to modest people: 
For the knowledge of thing which is imparted by the true Prophet is simple and plain 
and brief … to modest and simple minds, when they see things come to pass which 
have been foretold, it is enough, and more than enough, that they may receive most 
certain knowledge from most certain prescience and for the rest may be at peace, 
having received most certain knowledge of the truth (agnitio veritatis, Recognitiones 
8, 61:2) 
    Recognitiones describes the emergence of such knowledge in terms of struggle, in which 
the mind is illuminated: 
our mind is subject to errors … But the mind has it in its own nature to oppose and 
fight agains these, when the knowledge of truth (agnitio veritatis) shines upon it, by 
which knowledge is imparted fear of judgement to come, which is a fit governor of 
the mind, and which can recall it from the precipices of lusts (Recognitiones 9, 31:2). 
     In spite of its clumsiness, the pseudo-Clementine Recognitiones is a remarkable work 
since it unites two ancient traditions recognition, that is, the Aristotelian poetic re-
identification on the one hand and the legal and Pauline language of vertical agnitio on the 
other. We find repercussions of this language in Augustine and other Latin patristic sources. 
Augustine favors the phrases agnitio Dei and agnitio Christi but in some cases he can also 
employ agnitio veritatis.14  
     We can thus say that already in early Christianity and Latin patristic era an idea of vertical 
recognition is available, an idea that employs views of Aristotelian poetics and Roman law. 
However, this idea of vertical recognition has its own distinctive content in the act of 
conversion in which the mind turns towards the higher truth of revelation, acknowledging its 
priority vis-à-vis earthly realities. We may label this first Christian idea of recognition as 
conversion narrative, as the agnitio Christi or agnitio veritatis often means performative 
metanoia or conversion. 
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3. Medieval and Early Modern Recognition Discourses 
 
     In medieval theology, we can see a new vocabulary of mutual recognition emerging. This 
new vocabulary employs features of feudal law, that is, regulations concerning the 
relationship between lord and servant. In addition to lord and servant, the loving relationship 
between bridegroom and bride becomes becomes important. Allegorically, both the lord and 
the bridegroom can represent God or Christ, while the servant and the bride represent human 
beings or the faithful. Typically, the lord or the bridegroom in this relationship commends the 
servant or the bride and gives her a gift, a beneficium. The servant or the bride responds to 
this with an act of recognizing the lord or the groom. In this description, the Latin verbs 
recognosco and agnosco are employed synonymously. They do not signify an act of re-
identification but rather an act of normative approval in the mutual bond.  
     Bernard of Clairvaux’s Sermons on the Song of Songs employ this vocabulary in an 
abundant fashion and can be considered as a keynote text regarding the medieval view of 
theological recognition.15 I will now, however, resist the temptation to dwell on this 
wonderful work and proceed straightly to Thomas Aquinas. In Aquinas, we encounter the 
feudal terminology but also some views which sound astonishingly modern. For instance, 
Thomas explains the encounter between Mary Magdalene and risen Christ as follows. First 
Mary does not identify the other as Christ, but when Christ says to her “Mary”, she 
recognised (agnovit) Christ. In saying “Mary”, Christ is asking her “to recognize him who 
recognizes you” (recognosce eum a quo recognosceris).16 Significantly, Thomas speaks here 
of mutual recognition. While the meaning of re-identification is here relevant, the passage 
probably also includes the idea of mutual affirmation and showing respect. 
     Also when Aquinas is employing feudal terminology his conclusions sound surprisingly 
modern. He considers the people should react to divine gifts with a proper act taking place in 
recognitionem divini beneficii. He adds that such benefit creates a “debt of recognition” 
(debitum recognitionis).17  
     When it is asked whether we should pay honour to those in positions of dignity, Thomas 
answers as follows:  
a person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration; first, in so far 
as he obtains excellence of position, together with a certain power over subjects; 
secondly, as regards the exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence there 
is due to him honor, which is the recognition (recognitio) of some kind of excellence; 
and in respect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him worship, 
consisting in rendering him service … repaying him … for the benefits we received18 
Here, in a seemingly modern fashion, recognition concerns the status of a person, whereas the 
so-called worship concerns the achievements and merits. This sounds somewhat similar to 
Axel Honneth’s distinction between respect and esteem as two basic modes of recognition. 
The impression is strengthened when Thomas says in this context that we owe other person a 
twofold debt. The so-called legal debt concerns officeholders as pertaining to their status. The 
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so-called moral debt concerns persons without regard to the hierarchies existing between us 
and them.19  
    While recognition in Thomas Aquinas pertains to normative status and is only very thinly 
connected to re-identification or memory, it would be misleading to interpret it in a very 
modern fashion. Thomas assumes the background of feudal law and the exchange between 
the lord’s benefits and the servant’s recognition. It is nevertheless striking how mutual this 
relationship is and that there is a distinction between legal, obligatory respect and more 
voluntary esteem based on merits and performance. One also needs to remember that the 
feudal terminology is deeply relational. We are lords and servants, husbands and wives in a 
network of mutual dependence. While this relationality is different from late modern 
constructionism, they both share the idea that our identities are deeply heteronomous. It is 
this heteronomy and mutual dependence which makes Thomas Aquinas look modern in many 
ways.  
     When we come to the Reformation, the ideas of relational constitution and heteronomy 
continue to be influential, although the feudal law no longer serves as the conceptual 
background. Jean Calvin employs recognition terminology abundantly in his Institutio, 
radicalizing many medieval ideas. Calvin teaches that all humans express a sense of natural 
heteronomy and dependance on some higher being. All people are “compelled to 
acknowledge (agnosco) some God”.20  
     This natural heteronomy means not only servanthood but our complete belonging to God, 
as Calvin formulates in his Puritan manner:  
We are not our own: let neither our reason nor our will, therefore, sway our plans and 
deeds … We are not our own; in so far as we can, let us therefore forget ourselves and 
all that is ours. Conversely, we are God’s; let us therefore live for him and die for 
him.21 
     Like Thomas Aquinas, Calvin employs recognition terminology in the sense of normative 
affirmation. For him, however, the event of recognition consists of tribulations and radical 
self-denial, through which God’s true being can be known. I quote: 
in the very harshness of tribulations we must recognize (recognosco) the kindness and 
generosity of our Father towards us … When we acknowledge (agnoscimus) the 
Father’s rod, is it not our duty to show ourselves obedient and teachable children?22 
     Like the author of Pseudo-Clementine Recognitiones, Calvin teaches that we can only 
recognize God when our confused emotions are set aside, asking rhetorically as follows: 
Where is your recognition of God (recognitio Dei) if your flesh boiling over with 
excessive abundance into vile lusts infects the mind with its impurity … Ehere is our 
recognition of God (recognitio Dei) if our minds be fixed upon the the splendour our 
our apparel? For many so enslave all their senses to delights that the mind lies 
overwhelmed.23 
    For Calvin, the right knowledge and recognition of God is connected with truthful self-
knowledge. Therefore, one must first recognize and confess one’s own sinfulness and then 
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look toward God. When this process is successfully completed, Christians can becomes saints 
who have true knowledge of God and true self-knowledge. In such state of clarity, the saints 
can understand their humanity “without comparison with others, while they recognize 
themselves before God” (dum se coram Deo recognoscunt).24 In this manner, the absolute 
dependance on God finally leads to the relative autonomy in which one does not need to 
compare oneself with other humans. 
     In this quote, Calvin uses the reflexive form, se recognoscere, to recognize oneself. The 
reflexive form is used prominently in many texts of the Renaissance and the Reformation. It 
also appears in Augustine. Paul Ricoeur has paid attention to the phenomenon of recognizing 
oneself. It is one aspect of the classical philosophical theme of knowing oneself. Ricoeur 
explains the phenomenon with the help of anamnesis, recollection. We recognize ourselves 
with the help of memory.25 When I wake up in the morning, I re-identify my mind and body 
with the person who is in my memory from yesterday. When this happens every morning, I 
have an identity which is given from the memory as the recognition of myself. 
    This explanation is fitting when Augustine is concerned. In the Renaissance and the 
Reformation, however, the reflexive form se recognoscere is employed in a different 
meaning. The Renaissance philosopher Marsilio Ficino teaches in his De amore that I can 
become aware of our own deeper self when I fall in love and when I see my beloved. For in 
the face of my beloved I can recognize my own deeper self.26 In other words, the relational 
love between myself and my beloved gives me access to my deeper self. Ficino calls this 
relational access an act of se recognoscere.  
     Basically, Calvin employs the same figure of thought when he declares that the faithful 
can recognize themselves only when they let themselves be known and defined by God. In 
this relationship before God, coram Deo, the Christian can recognize oneself. In this manner, 
the event of recognizing themselves is not an act of memory but an act of interpersonal 
encounter. We can see this same figure, recognizing oneself through the other, also in Martin 
Luther’s monastic struggles with the understanding of God’s righteousness. Luther employs 
the terms agnosco, agnitio abundantly. He teaches that many different kinds of human 
acknowledgement are necessary in order that humans can renounce their own priorities and 
give God priority. Only after such renunciation God can verify and justify the sinful human 
person, giving him or her the deeper identity.27  
     The period from Bernard of Clairvaux to early modernity constitutes the second paradigm 
of Christian theology of recognition. While the first paradigm was labeled as conversion 
narrative, this second paradigm is much more relational and takes place in deep mutuality 
between the partners. As the divine commendation and benefit often occurs in terms of 
promise, it can be aptly summarized with this term. As the human response and new human 
condition leads to self-preservation, sometimes as feudal bond, sometimes as justificationa 
and salvation, sometimes as loving relationship, I summarize this response as self-
preservation. Therefore, the second paradigm of Christian recognition expresses the promise 
of self-preservation.  
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4. Religious Recognition in Modernity 
 
     The first and the second paradigms, conversion narrative and promise of self-preservation, 
take place predominantly in Latin theological writings. When we come to the modernity, we 
must consider the vernacular terminologies in some detail. English terminology is not very 
complex, as the verbs acknowledge and recognize carry over the Latin meanings of agnosco 
and recognosco. Regarding French terminology, Paul Ricoeur’s historical observations are 
problematic. He considers that the French verb reconnaitre starts to be used in the 17th and 
18th centuries and receives its normative meaning in Rousseau.28  
     However, the French edition of Calvin’s Institutio, published in 1560, already uses 
reconnaitre and reconnaissace abundantly, carrying over the normative meaning available in 
Latin.29 In my view, both the English and the French terminology display a remarkable 
continuation with the Latin traditions.  
     The German terminology is more complicated, as the words anerkennen, Anerkennung 
only start to be employed during the last decade of the 18th century. Contemporary social 
philosophy normally assumes that Hegel is the first thinker to give these terms an elaborated 
philosophical meaning.  
    However, if we look at German theological texts, we find a tradition which is older than 
Hegel. This tradition interacts with Hegelian philosophy but remains also an independent 
current of thought. The first German theologian to use Anerkennung in a prominent fashion is 
the Berlin Neologist Johann Joachim Spalding. In his popular bestseller, Religion, eine 
Angelegenheit des Menschen, 1796, Anerkennung is a key notion.30  
    In this book Spalding develops a philosophy of religion which can escape some of the 
criticism of theological thought presented by Immanuel Kant. Spalding admits that after Kant 
we may not present dogmatic or confessional religion in a scientific fashion. He argues, 
however, that an enlightened person realizes that he or she lives with the help of two 
fundamental instincts or feelings, namely, desire for moral goodness and desire for personal 
happiness. In order to live a reasonable life in which these two feelings exist in harmony, 
such person must in some way affirm a world-ruler (Weltregierer) who guarantees the 
existence of the goals of goodness and happiness. This act of primary affirmation Spalding 
calls Anerkennung. It is less than confession but more than a Kantian theoretical and practical 
knowledge.31 
     In keeping with this basic idea, Spalding defines religion as “recognition (Anerkennung) 
of the most perfect world-ruler in his relationship to us”. This means that the act of 
recognition does not produce objective knowledge but an affirmation with the first-person 
stance, a “relationship to us”. With the help of this primary Anerkennung, the enlightened 
person can believe in the goodness and happiness that is available for him.32 Spalding thus 
produces a derivation of many basic issues from the primary act of Anerkennung as follows: 
The working out of harmony between goodness and happiness is only possible 
through the recognition (Anerkennung) of a being that has intentionally equipped the 
                                                 
28 Ricoeur, 1-22, 207-208. 
29 Saarinen, 98-110. 
30 Saarinen, 125-136. Spalding, Johann Joachim, Religion, eine Angelegenheit des Menschen. 
Kritische Ausgabe 5 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001). 
31 Spalding, 24. Translations mine. 




soul with both basic feelings, so that neither of them is there in vain, without expected 
fulfilment. … With this conviction, the virtuous person has much more courage and 
his prevailing is confirmed. He can then say firmly and confidently: I will be true to 
my conscience, since through it alone I will in the end obtain everything that is good 
for me. He who made me will take care of that. But also for this reason I will honour 
the religion that justifies my saying this.33 
     When Spalding considers the act of Anerkennung to be the basic affirmation of religious 
world-view, he performs a move which is typical of most modern theories of recognition. In 
this modern view, the act of recognition produces a status change of the object. In Spalding, 
this status change is not philosophical or political, but rather an existential first-person status 
change. The primary act of recognition affirms the importance of the object for me 
personally. I call this modern view and third religious paradigm existential status change. 
     Spalding is nevertheless traditional in the sense that, for him, it is the human being who 
recognizes the importance of God. This usage is common in both the first paradigm of 
conversion and the second paradigm of self-preservation. Shortly after Spalding, Friedrich 
Schleiermacher reverses the order of status change. In his prominent dogmatics, Der 
christliche Glaube, Schleiermacer defines the act of justification as follows: 
That God justifies the person who converts entails that God forgives his sins and 
recognizes (anerkennt) him as a child of God. This change of a person’s relationship 
to God occurs only when he has a true faith in the redeemer.34 
     Schleiermacher here conceives Anerkennung as a downward act, through which God 
justifies the human being. In his commentary of this statement, Schleiermacher reflects on the 
concept of childhood of God, connecting this theme with adoption and Roman law. 
Schleiermacher’s use of the concept of recognition is not accidental. He connects the 
downward Anerkennung with the ancient legal model of adoption. Like in Spalding, 
however, it is the status change of the object which is distinctive in the act of religious 
recognition.  
     The theological view of Anerkennung continues from Spalding and Schleiermacher to the 
dialectical theology of the 20th century. We find it prominently represented in Rudolf 
Bultmann’s entries to Kittel’s Theologisches Wörterbuch des Neuen Testaments. Both in the 
entry ginosko, to know, and pisteuo, to believe, Bultmann considers that in the biblical 
vocabulary the act of knowing entails the act of affirming or recognizing (anerkennen). 
Bultmann says, for instance, that a human understanding of divine will is “primarily 
recognition, an obedient or thankful submission to what is known”. Christian knowledge is 
“an obendient and grateful recognition (Anerkennung) of the deeds and demands of God”. 
Gnosis in New Testament does not mean theoretical information but a “recognition of God’s 
new plan of salvation”. The Greek term epignosis in particular is “almost a technical term for 
the decisive knowledge of God which is implied in the conversion fo the Christian faith”.35 
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     It is fascinating that in these words of Bultmann we hear our first paradigm, the idea that 
agnitio veritatis is basically a conversion. At the same time, we also hear the modern 
paradigm of existential status change. A Christian does not receive religious information but 
he or she makes a first-person leap of faith, a primary recognition which makes everything 
else meaningful. 
     Karl Barth likewise makes use of such primary and existential understanding of 
recognition. In his Kirchliche Dogmatik, Barth opposes the idea that religious conviction 
proceeds from knowledge to assent. In Barth’s view, such order does not pay proper attention 
to the primacy of assent in religious faith. Like Spalding, Barth teaches that we must first 
make an act of recognition, Anerkennen, in order to make sense of religion. In his view, faith 
consists of Anerkennen, Erkennen and Bekennen, that is recognition, knowing and 
confessing, which follow in this order. Barth explains: 
Christian faith is an acknowlegdement, Anerkennen. In our description … this must 
come first … Knowing, Erkennen, is certainly included in the acknowledgement, but 
it can only follow it. Acknowledgement is a cognition which is obedient and 
compliatn, which yields and subordinates itself. This obedience and compliance is not 
an incidental and subsequent characteristic of the act of faith, but primary, basic, and 
decisive. It is not preceded by any other kind of knowledge, either knowing or 
confessing.36 
    In other words, Barth claims, like Bultmann and Spalding, that the act of recognition must 
come first in Christian faith. Knowing and confessing make sense after the primary act of 
Anerkennen, recognition. We see here again out third paradigm of theological recognition at 
work. An existential status change of the object must come first in order that intellectual 
content can follow. This is in a way the classical model of fides quaerens intellectum. Let it 
be mentioned that some contemporary philosophical models are fairly close to the model o 
Barth. Axel Honneth, for instance, claims programmatically that recognition precedes 
cognition. This is the case already in infant psychology, because the infant needs an 
attachement and an object relation before it can learn and develop cognitively.37 While the 
modern theological model of Bultmann and Barth should not be confused with philosophical 
theories of recognition, they both affirm an idea of existential attachment which is connected 
with the status change of the object.  
     In contemporary German theology, Eberhard Jüngel is a prominent representative of such 
thinking. In his book on justification by faith, published first in 1998, Jüngel writes that “it is 
essential or people to be recognized. Their personhood depends on it. As human beings, we 
demand recognition for ourselves. The wish for justification has its source in this basic 
human need for recognition.”38 
     To summarize my brief outline of the history of religious recognition in Christianity. 
Recognition is an old topic which is discussed more or less continuously from Early 
Christianity to today. Three basic paradigms can be detected. The oldest paradigm, 
conversion narrative, focuses on the change of the recognizing subject. The second paradigm, 
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dominant from the twelfth to the eighteenth century, emphasizes mutual recognition in a 
relational setting. In this setting, God makes promises and the human being enters a bond 
which leads to self-preservation. Also the idea of self-recognition through others plays a role 
in this second paradigm. The third paradigm expresses a status change of the recognized 
object. In religion, however, this is not a political or diplomatic act, but a primary existential 
attachment which opens the recognizer to a new understanding of religion and theology.  
     I have emphasized that even the third paradigm is older than Hegel’s thought, and that 
Hegel’s thinking may be indebted to the second paradigm. The main finding is, however, that 
recognition is a classical topic o Christian theology. We should also be aware that current 
theories of recognition also affirm the possibility that recognition does not only pertain to the 
status of its object.  It is rather the case that all parties change in the event of recognition. 
This is particularly visible in those theories in which recognition is understood in terms of 
gift exchange. But also the Hegelian theories of struggle can make the point that this struggle 
changes everyone, both the recognizer and the recognizee. Christian theology has been aware 
of all these conceptual possibilities. Therefore one can say that recognition is a less secular 
idea than toleration and that the so-called politics of recognition has deep Christian roots. 
     Having said this, it is important to add that religious recognition cannot provide all the 
answers elaborated in social theory. Taylor and Honneth aim at clarifying how democratic 
society can affirm both difference and equality at the same time. In democracy, we can affirm 
both the lasting difference or otherness and the fundamental and practical equality of every 
member of society. The tradition of religious recognition outlined above makes visible some 
important aspects of otherness. Bridegroom and bride, lord and servant, God and God’s 
people recognize one another in terms of lasting otherness. Christian theology can consider 
issues of positive otherness. On the other hand, such relationships are hierarchical and do not 
propagate equality in the manner of social theory. There is, however, one field of theology in 
which horizontal forms of mutual recognition among equals are being elaborated. This is 
ecumenism, the last section of my presentation. 
 
5. Recognition in Ecumenical Theology: Difference and Equality 
 
     The concept of mutual recognition among equals was already employed in the early 
ecumenical movement before the Second World War. These early discussion did not, 
however, employ a theological concept of recognition. They rather borrowed the diplomatic 
concept from international politics. In this manner, a 1937 Faith and Order text formulates as 
follows: 
To speak of mutual recognition is to enter the area of inter-church relationships. As in 
the case of civil governments, ‘recognition’ is a condition or further relationships, so 
it is with the Churches. Mutual recognition may be partial or complete. It does not 
necessarily involve any co-operative action or Corporate Union…39 
    After the Second World War we notice an elaboration of the idea of mutual recognition in 
the ecumenical movement. According to the so-called “Toronto Declaration” of 1950, the 
churches need not recognize one another when they are members of the World Council of 
                                                 
39 ‘Meanings of Unity, The’. Report No 1 Prepared by the Commission on the Church’s 
Unity in Life and Worship for the World Conference on Faith and Order, Edinburgh, 1937. 





Church. However, they must all recognize Jesus “Christ as the Divine Head of the Body”. In 
addition, they need “to recognize in other churches elements of the true Church”. Such 
formulations give the impression of a mediated recognition, in which a third party, Jesus 
Christ, unites the partners who cannot recognize one another directly. This is already a 
variant of theological recognition.40  
    The texts of the Second Vatican Council mark a new awareness and deepening of the idea 
of ecumenical recognition. The council texts employ the old Latin notion of agnosco often 
and in significant places. Lumen Gentium (9) considers that God gathers God’s people among 
those who “acknowledge him in truth”. Nostra aetate (2) speaks of the “acknowledgement of 
a supreme deity or even of a Father” by the adherents of other religions. 
     The Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis redintegratio (3-4) considers that Catholics must 
gladly acknowledge (agnosco) and esteem the truly Christian endowments which derive from 
our common heritage ... It is right and salutary to recognize (agnosco) the riches of Christ and 
the virtuous deeds in the lives of others’. While the Catholic Church does not recognize other 
churches as churches in the full sense of the term, it does recognize certain spiritual treasures 
in them. 
      In the Eastern churches in particular, Christ can be ‘acknowledged (agnosceretur) as 
being truly and properly Son of God and son of man, according to the Scriptures’. Catholics 
‘must recognize (agnoscendum est) the admirable way in which they [the theological 
traditions of the eastern church] have their roots in holy scripture’. Eastern theological 
language is considered ‘as mutually complementary rather than conflicting’ with Catholic 
statements. (Unitatis redintegratio, 16-17). In this sense, some horizontal recognition takes 
place between different ecclesiastical traditions. It can thus be argued that the Council 
develops a certain politics of multiculturalism and a recognition of otherness. 
     This vocabulary of Vatican II was further developed by Heinrich Fries, Walter Kasper and 
Joseph Ratzinger in their ecumenical writings during the 1970s. Kasper and Ratzinger 
emphasize that the recognition of other parties does not proceed in a diplomatic manner but it 
remains a spiritual and theological act which assumes a new orientation of the one who 
recognizes. Heinrich Fries writes that, on the one hand, recognition of others expresses a 
legitimate theological plurality. On the other hand, a relationship of mutual recognition also 
assumes a common ground (ein Gemeinsames), which can bridge the differences.41 This 
position of Fries resembles the ecumenical method of differentiating consensus, as employed 
in the Lutheran – Roman Catholic document “Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of 
Justification” (1999).42  
     In some sense, Vatican II and theological discussions derived from it revive the old 
Christian way of speaking about agnitio, a recognition that also means metanoia and even 
conversion. When Ratzinger and Kasper emphasize that recognition is a spiritual act, they are 
also reviving the first and second paradigm in which recognition is much more than a status 
change of its object. In the first and second paradigm, the change of the recognizing subject 
remains in the focus of recognition. Therefore, theological recognition is different from 
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political and diplomatic processes of recognition. Conversion, or at least spiritual openness, is 
needed for the theological recognition of the other.  
     At the same time, such spiritual emphasis does not mean subjectivism. Fries emphasizes 
the importance of common ground with good reason. In addition to these Catholic 
considerations, I think that the third paradigm which emphasizes the existential primacy of 
the subject does not aim at subjectivism as such. The modern Protestant paradigm which 
leads from Spalding and Schleiermacher to Bultmann and Barth wants to highlight the 
specific nature of theological acts of recognition.  
     In a modern world that separates religion from naturalism and science, theologians need to 
emphasize the importance of first-person stance and existential commitment.  When we 
emphasize this, we do not aim at subjectivism but rather to an opening through which the 
intellectual resources of theology can be visible. This means fides quaerens intellectum rather 
than separatist fideism. Given this, the third paradigm, the existential status change of the 
object, is not very far from Kasper’s and Ratzinger’s ideas of spiritual recognition and 
interpersonal encounter.  
     In sum, theologians discussed the issues of recognition in a profound manner already in 
the 1970s. In social theory, we find similar discussions during the 1990s. Theologians were, 
for once, ahead of their times. The ecumenical documents which emerged from this trend 
often employ explicitly the language of mutual acknowledgement and recognition. They do 
not compare ecumenical recognition with political or diplomatic acts, but affirm the specific 
theological nature of ecumenical encounter.  
     A good example of this kind is the so-called “Porvoo Declaration”, a full communion 
agreement between the Church of England and the North European Lutheran churches. This 
document repeatedly uses the formula “we acknowledge” to lay out the mutual understanding 
reached in matters of faith. While the agreement assumes equality and lasting difference 
between the partner churches, it also declares their readiness to be open for changes.43 
Although the drafters of Porvoo declaration may not have been aware of the long history of 
theological recognition, they have practiced and continued it in their ecumenical 
formulations. I hope that the increasing awareness of the history of theological recognition 
paradigms may help contemporary Christians and their churches in encountering other 
churches and other religions in terms of genuine equality and sincere difference. 
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